We analyze the effect of worker inflows on establishments' productivity, using German data. Previous studies for other countries have found positive effects of hiring workers from superior (more productive or higher paying) firms. Ranking establishments by their median wage, we find that inflows from inferior establishments seem to increase hiring establishments' productivity. Further empirical analyses suggest our findings are due to a positive selection of such inflows from their sending establishments. These workers might have to find a better job match in order to advance their careers, an interpretation supported by the finding that the effect is driven by workers with short tenure at their previous employer. Our findings reflect the increasingly assortative pattern of worker mobility in Germany found in a related strand of literature.
INTRODUCTION
Can firms become more productive by hiring the right workers? If so, who are these workers, and what makes them particularly valuable? A growing literature has come to the tacit consensus that worker inflows to a firm increase productivity if they come fromin some sensesuperior firms (notably, Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012 , 2014 and Serafinelli, 2013 . In this context, superiority is defined as higher productivity or a higher wage level. The results from this literature are interpreted as evidence of spillover effects between heterogeneous firms, as workers moving from superior to inferior firms transfer their acquired superior knowledge to the hiring firm. Thus, firms can become more productive by hiring from superior firms.
However, workers hired from superior firms may not be randomly selected. Indeed, as they move to a potentially less attractive employer, they could even be negatively selected from their sending firms, which might inhibit their effectiveness as knowledge carriers and prevent any positive effects on hiring firms' productivity. In contrast, inflows from inferior firms could be positively selected. The latter would be in line with findings from the theoretical as well as the empirical literature: Theoretical models of on-the-job search and matching suggest that job-to-job moves are largely cases of 'job shopping,' whereby workers search for better job matches, particularly in the early stages of their careers (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979) . Furthermore, a growing body of empirical studies for various countries suggests that high-wage workers increasingly sort into high-wage firms (e.g., Card et al., 2013) .
Whether workers hired from superior (inferior) firms are negatively (positively) selected may depend on structural and institutional circumstances affecting worker mobility, such as employment protection (e.g., Haltiwanger et al., 2014) . Hence, previous studies' findings (for Denmark, parts of Italy and Norway) may not apply to Germany, which our study focuses on. As a novelty to the literature on productivity effects of worker inflows, thus, we test for knowledge spillover effects (from superior-firm inflows) and worker selection effects (from inferiorfirm inflows) on hiring firms' productivity. We use a unique linked employeremployee dataset for Germany and apply various econometric techniques (including structural production function estimators and GMM) to identify effects. Our results indicate no spillover effects, but substantial positive productivity effects of hiring workers from inferior (lower paying) firms. Furthermore, these workers are found to be strongly positively selected from their firms of origin, and in line with previous literature, the positive productivity effect is driven by inferior-firm inflows with short tenure at their firms of origin.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we sketch our theoretical conception of the mobility processes and the productivity and wage outcomes studied empirically. We investigate worker mobility as a reallocation mechanism in the labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers. We abstract from product-market shocks and thus from changes to firms' total employment as well as from firm dynamics (market entry and exit). Furthermore, we ignore mobility costs due to the geographical, industrial, or occupational distance between jobs. We think of both firm and worker heterogeneity in terms of productivity (although empirically we have to resort to wages). Thus, workers can move from highly productive to less productive firms or in the reverse direction, workers are also heterogeneous in terms of productivity, and wages are a function of productivity. In this setup, worker mobility between firms can be both cause and effect of firms' and workers' productivity and wages. We propose two main channels through which these effects come about.
The first channel is knowledge transfer. Workers acquire knowledge on the job, and knowledge acquired at highly productive firms may be more valuable (productivity enhancing) than knowledge acquired at less productive firms. To the extent that this knowledge spills over to coworkers and subsequent employers, worker mobility serves as a channel of knowledge diffusion (Dasgupta, 2012) . This transferred knowledge should be distinguished from human capital, which is defined as a purely individual (worker level) resource. This knowledge transfer is the main channel of effects referred to by Zubanov (2012, 2014) , Serafinelli (2013) , and related empirical studies. These studies focus on firm-level productivity effects, respectively, worker mobility as a channel of interfirm productivity spillovers. In contrast, details about the underlying mobility process -, i.e., heterogeneous workers' decisions to move between heterogeneous firmsare not the focus of these studies.
We regard this mobility process as a second channel of effects worth investigating, drawing on the theoretical literature on on-the-job search and matching (briefly reviewed below) and highlighting worker-firm matching as a determinant of productivity and wage outcomes. We suppose that an employed worker's mobility decisions depend on the wage in the current job and potential outside wage offers. Furthermore, a worker's productivity and wage depend on how well the worker matches the demands of his or her job. Worker mobility can help dissolve bad matches, yielding better matches instead, where better means more productive and, accordingly, higher paying. Workers advance their careers by accepting better wage offers as these arrive, so mobility reduces mismatch (Burdett, 1978) . More precisely, workers learn about the quality of their current match while on the job and bad matches (low paying) are dissolved as soon as possible, whereas good matches (high paying) continue until an even better match comes along (Jovanovic, 1979) . In the following section, we review empirical evidence for both channelsknowledge diffusion and improvement of match qualitythrough which worker mobility affects productivity and wages.
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A strand of empirical literature provides evidence of the knowledge-diffusion function of worker mobility. Zubanov (2012, 2014) find that labor productivity and total factor productivity in Danish manufacturing firms are positively associated with inflows of workers from more productive manufacturing firms, and the relationship becomes stronger as the productivity gap between sending and hiring firms widens. Taking several means to reduce endogeneity bias, Zubanov (2012, 2014) identify the upper bound of a potentially causal effect of hiring employees from more productive firms on hiring firms' productivity. In contrast, otherwise similar inflows from less productive firms do not have a positive effect on hiring firms' productivity.
Closely related to Zubanov's (2012, 2014) productivity gap approach, Serafinelli (2013) studies the impact of worker inflows from high-paying firms (a proxy for highly productive firms) on receiving (nonhigh paying) firms' productivity for a sample of Italian firms, also finding a positive effect. This result, too, survives a number of measures against reverse causality bias, for example, using local high-wage firm downsizings as an instrumental variable for the number of inflows from such firms. Analogous to Zubanov (2012, 2014) , it is found that inflows from nonhigh-paying firms do not have an effect on hiring firms' productivity. A number of related studies indicate qualitatively similar patterns; see Møen (2005) , Maliranta et al. (2009 ), Balsvik (2011 ), Poole (2013 and Kaiser et al. (2015) .
However, there is also empirical evidence of workers moving toward highly productive, high-paying firms. Job mobility is considered an important source of career advancementmeasured by wage increasesat least since Topel and Ward (1992) . More recently, Haltiwanger et al. (2017) found that worker mobility in the United States across jobs typically follows an upward trend in the between-firm wage hierarchy, thereby functioning as a major mechanism of upward wage mobility. In addition, firms become increasingly important in determining a worker's wage (Barth et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence for the United States). Moreover, highly paid workers have been found to sort into high-paying firms (Card et al., 2013; Borovi ckov a and Shimer, 2017) ;. Similarly, Martins (2011) shows that worker flows from domestic (inferior) to foreign (superior) firms in Portugal typically have been the better-paid employees in their sending establishment.
Against this background, it seems somewhat puzzling that studies focusing on the productivity effects of worker flows between heterogeneous firms have detected positive effects from 'downward' inflows (knowledge diffusion or spillover effect), but no such effects from 'upward' inflows (selection effect). The latter would be in line with Jovanovic's (1979) hypothesis of job mobility as a channel of career advancement: From a worker's perspective, a better match means a job at a better firm. Focusing, as we do, on immediate job-to-job mobility, workers should move only when receiving a better wage offer. Considering the positive selection of 'upward' movers found empirically, only the most productive workers at less productive firms seem to receive such offers at all. Thus, moving from inferior to superior firms could be interpreted as a match-improvement channel reserved for the most productive employees of less productive firms.
The two competing hypotheses (spillover vs. selection effect) beg the question of which of the two effects prevails under given circumstances. We may assume that knowledge is similarly transferable in different national labor markets. However, there are pronounced cross-country differences in the amount and characteristics of worker mobility between firms. In particular, national regulations such as employment protection laws (EPL) have important implications for reallocation in the labor market (Bassanini, 2010; Haltiwanger et al., 2014) . Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) , who study the effect of EPL on voluntary job quits in a cross-country setting, find that EPL is negatively related to the voluntary mobility. 1 Moreover, they show that in countries with strict EPL, even workers who report a low degree of job satisfaction are relatively unlikely to quit their jobs, possibly because of low job offer arrival rates, low chances of finding good matches and long probationary periods. In such a setting, quitting a job at a high-paying (superior) firm and moving to an inferior firm seems particularly risky.
At the same time, Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) find that in countries with strict EPL, voluntary job mobility is associated with relatively high wage gains, while there is no such effect in the countries with the least strict EPL (including the United States, the United Kingdom and Denmark), supposedly because giving up one's job is less risky in these countries for the abovementioned reasons, so there is less need for hiring (destination) firms to compensate quitters. 2 Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) findings suggest that strict EPL regimes such as Germany's induce a positive selection of direct job-to-job movers. The overall positive-1. As demonstrated in the descriptive section, most of the job moves included in our analysis are probably voluntary. 2. The data used by Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) do not contain Germany, but one may consider Austria, which the data include, as a proxy for Germany (see also Bassanini, 2010 and Martin and Scarpetta, 2012) . assortative matching pattern found for Germany (Card et al., 2013) may be driven, interalia, by this EPL-induced selection mechanism. Against this background, one might expect a positive selection of job-to-job movers, particularly in the 'upward' direction. Thus, positive-assortative matching in Germany could be associated with positive productivity effects of 'upward' worker flows. Accordingly, we may find a selection effect of upward inflows, rather than a spillover effect of downward inflows, on German establishments' productivity.
DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT OF WORKER INFLOWS
We construct a linked employer-employee panel based on German data from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Individual-level data are obtained from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), establishment level data from the Establishment History Panel (BHP) and the IAB Establishment Panel. In line with related studies, we analyze only productivity effects for (hiring) establishments in the manufacturing sector (NACE industries 15 through 41), as the interpretation of value-added is more consistent when focusing on this sector. For details on data sources and definitions, for example, who counts as a direct worker flow between two jobs, see Appendix A.
The key to our estimation model is to identify worker inflows to each establishment in our sample and to determine for each inflow whether he or she comes from a superior or inferior establishment. Unlike Zubanov (2012, 2014) , we do not have data on sending establishments' productivity in terms of value-added. Such data are available only from the IAB Establishment Panel (a survey and the basis of our hiring-establishment sample, for which we estimate productivity effects), but not for the population of establishments. Similar to Serafinelli (2013) , thus, we use establishment-level wage measures to rank establishments. We use two different measures, first, an establishment fixed effect obtained from wage regressions, as described in detail in Appendix B. Second, a simpler, readily available measure to rank sending and hiring establishments is their median wage. We use the logarithm of the establishment median wage (computed only for full-time workers) and, as for the establishment fixed effect, clear it of three-digit industry fixed effects, using the obtained measure as an alternative criterion to rank sending and hiring establishments. To assess both measures, we compare them to direct measures of productivity for the hiring establishments in Appendix Table A1 .
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Our final estimation sample contains 1,806 manufacturing establishments observed between 2002 and 2007, i.e., we have up to six observations per establishment (4,268 observations in total). Because of the economic crisis in 2008/ 2009, we do not use the years afterward. Following the terminology of Zubanov (2012, 2014) , we refer to inflows from superior firms as 'spillover potentials' (SPs) and those from inferior firms as Non-SPs. However, note that Non-SPs may as well hold the potential to increase hiring firms' productivity, as discussed above. Grouping establishment observations by whether they have any inflows, any SP inflows, or any Non-SP inflows, yields the numbers displayed in Table 1 : Half of all establishment observations in our estimation sample have a positive number of worker inflows. Of these, 76% have at least one inflow from a superior (higher paying) establishment. Similarly, 72% of hiring establishments have at least one Non-SP inflow. The sample represents 15,141 worker flows, 43% of which (6,507) are classified as SPs. This is close to the 45% found by Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) . Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes establishment characteristics. It is worth noting that half our sample establishments are located in Eastern Germany, far above their share in the population. This disproportion is due to the sampling design of the IAB Establishment Panel, and we will account for it by running separate regressions for East and West. A potentially worrisome point in this context is that worker flows between East and West may be asymmetrically Westbound, due to the Western regions' higher productivity and wage levels, yet this is not the case: Over 90% of flows change employers within the same part of the country, and East-to-West moves are no more frequent than moves in the reverse direction. Among the establishments that hire any workers, those hiring SPs are slightly smaller and have lower value-added and capital levels than those hiring at least one Non-SP worker. 3 This was to be expected: By definition, hiring SPs means hiring from more productive establishments; thus, the larger and more productive an establishment is, the less likely it is for a given worker inflow to be an SP. Table 2 summarizes employment characteristics of our establishment sample, again with the focus on distinguishing hirers, nonhirers and hirers of SPs, respectively, Non-SPs. 4 In Table 3 , we take a look at incumbent workers' and inflows' individual characteristics. We find that inflows are more highly qualified than incumbents, yet they earn substantially lower wages (at the hiring establishment, i.e., after the job move), presumably due to their lower age and tenure. 5 The SPs have a much better skill structure than Non-SPs: The share of high-skilled SPs is roughly double that of high-skilled Non-SPs. Non-SP inflows are also younger than SPs. Younger workers' job moves have been found to respond more strongly to wage incentives (cf. Hunt, 2006) , which suggests that Non-SPs might be following wage incentives more than SPs.
Looking at the wage profiles of SPs and Non-SPs (Appendix Figure A1 ), we find that SPs have higher earnings levels both before and after the job move. It is not surprising that SPs generally earn higher wages, particularly at their sending establishments, as these are defined by paying relatively high wages. Their mean sending-establishment daily wage (129 €) is well above Non-SPs' (87 €) and is still some 20% higher at the hiring establishment. However, Non-SPs achieve tremendous wage gains (25 € on average) by their job move, almost four times as high as SPs' average wage change. Similarly, only 14% of Non-SPs see their wage 3. Descriptive statistics are based on the SP definition using the log establishment median wage, but almost unchanged if the establishment fixed wage effect is used instead (not reported). 4. All statistics in this table are weighted by the establishment's full-time equivalent number of employees. 5. All monetary variables are deflated to 2010 levels using the consumer price index. decrease after the move, compared to 38% for SPs. Broadly speaking, these wage trajectories suggest that most job moves are beneficial to the workers and therefore voluntary, particularly in the case of Non-SPs. These findings can be interpreted as a first hint that SPs and Non-SPs differ in their unobservable characteristics. Such unobservable productivity differences between SPs and Non-SPs may counteract or even outweigh potential spillover effects. Previous studies have considered AKM-style person fixed effects to control for inflows' unobserved characteristics. We are able to merge part of our inflow data with the person fixed effect (CHK effect) provided by Card et al. (2015) , which the authors interpret as "a combination of skills and other factors that are rewarded equally across employers" (p. 4). As Table 3 shows, on average, SPs have a higher person fixed effect than Non-SPs. However, this may reflect the persistence in individuals' wages across employers (see Figure A1 ), rather than their unobserved productivity. Furthermore, from these fixed effects it is not obvious whether SPs and Non-SPs are selected differently from among their sending-establishment coworkers. To measure such a potential selectivity, we compute the moving workers' wage relative to their coworkers at the sending establishment. This metric indicates whether workers are positively or negatively selected from their sending establishments. We obtain the wage position of each moving worker, both for the sending (j) and hiring (i) establishment, from the wage regression used to obtain the establishment fixed effect (Appendix B, equation B1). We normalize the residual, to make it comparable across establishments:
The parameter 0 pi indicates each worker's wage position relative to coworkers with the same age, gender, qualification, occupation and occupation status. Thus, positive values of 0 pi indicate above-average wages in a thus defined cell, while negative values indicate below-average wages. We can, therefore, determine for each worker inflow whether he or she is positively or negatively positioned within his or her sending/hiring-establishment peer group. Card et al. (2013 Card et al. ( , 2015 . b Worker inflows from higher paying establishments. c worker inflows from lower paying establishments. For definition of higher/lower paying, see Section 4.
According to our estimates 0 pi , Non-SPs are clearly positively selected from among their peers in the sending establishment (see Figure 1 ; all four mean values are statistically significantly different from zero). This is not necessarily the case for SPs, who are only slightly positively selected from sending establishments, on average. However, Non-SPs do not move to a better relative wage position than SPs at their hiring establishments: Once they arrive, Non-SPs belong to the low-wage earners among their coworkers. In contrast, SPs generally move into positive-wage positions. These findings reflect persistence in workers' wage levels: Having been employed at high-paying establishments seems to secure SPs a high-wage position at subsequent employers. This is in line with the larger CHK person fixed effect in Table 3 . In contrast, Non-SPs may be 'scarred' from having been employed at a low-wage establishment, which carries over to their wage position at later employers. Again, we checked whether these differences are driven by imbalances between Eastern and Western Germany but found very little difference. Therefore, our descriptive findings suggest that a selection takes place and sending-establishment wage positions should be controlled for when analyzing inflows' productivity effects.
Against this background, we do not have a clear expectation regarding our main research questionwhich worker inflows increase hiring establishments' productivity? On the one hand, SPs' generally higher wage levels and their experience at high-paying (and therefore, supposedly, highly productive) establishments suggest that SPs could be highly productive knowledge carriers, capable of increasing hiring establishments' productivity. On the other hand, Non-SPs are a positive selection from their sending establishments and thus may increase hiring establishments' productivity. In the following econometric analysis, thus, a central task is to control as thoroughly as possible for inflows' individual productivity, in order to identify the productivity effect of worker inflows that stem solely from the superiority (for SPs) or inferiority (for Non-SPs) of their sending establishment. As the above descriptive findings indicate, the job moves we analyze are necessarily endogenous with respect to hiring firms' productivity, since workers follow wage incentives. What stands out in particular is the positive selection of Non-SPs from their sending firms. Therefore, in the following production function estimation, we apply several means to account for the endogeneity of worker inflows, considering in particular the selection of workers from their sending firms.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Specification
To estimate the productivity effect of hiring workers from superior and inferior firms, we model firms' output (or value-added) as a function of both types of inflows, controlling for capital, labor, as well as firms', incumbent workers' and inflows' characteristics. As shown by Stoyanov and Zubanov (2014) , labor can be modeled as a heterogeneous input consisting of inflows from superior firms (SPs), inflows from inferior firms (Non-SPs) and all other workers (other inflows, for example, from education and incumbent workers). Based on a hiring firm's production function in Cobb-Douglas form, Stoyanov and Zubanov (2014) express labor in efficiency units, where SPs have a productivity advantage over all other employees. This yields the following simplified production function in logs (cf. Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2014, p. 20) :
where y it is log value-added and k it andl it are log capital and log labor, 6 respectively, share SP it and share NonSP it are the shares of SPs and Non-SPs, respectively, in total employment, and the coefficients # 1 and # 2 capture the productivity effect of hiring SPs and Non-SPs. 7 New hires out of nonemployment are treated, such as incumbents (see also Appendix A). According to this reduced-form model, thus, a firm's productivity depends on how many SPs and Non-SPs it has hired in the previous period, as a share of its total employment in that period. Our estimation equation can thus be formulated as follows:
Inflows are defined as employees who have arrived at some point between January 1, year t À 1 and January 1, year t and are still present at January 1, year t (see also Appendix A). Their classification into SPs and Non-SPs is based on the sending and hiring establishment's median wage (or fixed wage effect) as of June 30, year t À 2, since this is the last year they have potentially entirely spent at their former employer. 6 . In measuring labor, we approximate full-time equivalents by applying the weights of 0.3 and 0.6, respectively, to workers with < 18 hours per week and those with 18 or more weekly work hours but less than full-time (we do not observe work hours more precisely). 7. New hires who were previously not employed are treated like incumbents.
If it does not matter to hiring firms' productivity whether their worker inflows originate from more or less highly paying (and therefore, approximately, more or less productive) establishments, we should obtain the same estimate for # 1 and # 2 . If inflows do not matter for productivity at all, we should obtain insignificant estimates for both parameters. However, to interpret our estimates in this way, SPs and Non-SPs must not differ in their individual productivity-relevant characteristics. We know from the descriptive analysis that they do differ in terms of qualification, age, wages and wage positions, both in their sending and hiring establishments. Thus, we include several control variables for inflows (vector controls inflows it ): the share of high-qualified workers 8 among all inflows; their respective mean age and mean of age squared; and their fixed wage effect as estimated by Card et al. (2015) , which comprises unobserved individual-level wage determinants. These controls are analogous to those used in Zubanov (2012, 2014) and Serafinelli (2013) . As argued above, an important characteristic of Non-SPs in Germany is their strongly positive selection from sending establishments. Since hiring Non-SPs may increase hiring establishments' productivity for precisely this reason, we optionally include the mean wage position of SPs and Non-SPs in their sending establishments, expecting a positive and significant coefficient for this variable.
The control variables vector ESTAB it includes categorical variables indicating whether the establishment is part of a larger enterprise, its legal form, the (selfreported) state of technical equipment, a dummy indicating young establishments (younger than 10 years) and the share of exports in total revenues. EMPL it is the vector of employment structure controls, containing the share of high-qualified employees, the mean age and the share of males among all employees.
A fundamental problem in firm-level productivity estimation is that input coefficients are estimated with bias in the Pooled OLS case since there can be omitted idiosyncratic productivity shocks and reverse causality, i.e., a direct influence of expected future productivity on inputs (see, for example, Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010) . In our context, if we find a positive correlation between establishments' productivity and their hiring of certain workers, this might mean either that the worker inflows increase productivity, or that highly productive establishments attract certain workers because workers anticipate establishments' productivity. The two main approaches to minimize this bias are, first, 'structural' (control function) approaches trying to model unobserved idiosyncratic productivity determinants explicitly (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2015; Wooldridge, 2009) , and second, dynamic panel data (DPD) approaches that use internal instruments in panel datasets (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Bond, 1998, 2000) . For a detailed discussion of the respective pros and cons, see Appendix C. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, and in our view, there is no straightforward reason to prefer one approach to the other. We will, therefore, employ both classes of estimators. One limitation we face either way, as already noted by Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) , is that we cannot control for unobserved hiring preferences regarding the origin of newly hired workers. Such preferences are not necessarily part of the unobserved idiosyncratic productivity shock that the 'structural' 8. Holders of a university or university of applied sciences degree. estimators model explicitly, or of the establishment fixed effect that the DPD estimators control for. However, the DPD estimators should be less sensitive to this problem since they use only the variation in the inflow variables induced by the internal instruments.
Results
As a baseline, we estimate equation (1) using Pooled OLS, including two lags of the dependent variable (log value-added), as this is found to remove residual autocorrelation. First, we estimate a simplified model including the labor share of all inflows (SPs plus Non-SPs divided by labor) and the set of control variables defined above. The first column of Table 4 indicates that productivity is not significantly related to hiring intensity as such. In the second and third columns, we split inflows according to their classification as SPs or Non-SPs. The results indicate a positive association of Non-SP hiring with productivity, whereas the coefficient of SP hiring is near zero and insignificant. Concerning the core production factors, our estimates imply almost constant returns to scale (the sum of long-run capital and labor coefficients is 1.04). However, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased by determinants of productivity observed by the establishment but not by the econometrician. Therefore, we estimate both of the latter OLS specifications using the structural control function approaches developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . The results are displayed in Table 5 and confirm the above finding: Having hired Non-SPs in the previous year is positively and significantly related to an establishment's productivity.
Another concern not yet addressed is that establishment heterogeneity, which is rather persistent and largely unobserved, may codetermine productivity outcomes and hiring strategies. To address this concern, we apply the System GMM estimator, which accounts for unobserved time-invariant establishment heterogeneity by using only within-establishment variation. Furthermore, the estimator addresses reverse causality by instrumenting current differences in endogenous variables with past levels, and current levels with past differences. 9 We treat capital and labor as well as the SP and Non-SP shares as endogenous. For estimation we apply the two-step robust System GMM using all available (max. 4) lags as instruments. 10 The results are presented in Table 6 . Focusing on the more parsimonious specifications in the first and second column, hiring Non-SPs is still found significantly positively related to productivity. Thus, even when controlling for reverse causality and unobserved time-invariant establishment characteristics, the share of Non-SPs is positively associated with productivity. The long-run capital and labor coefficients still indicate near-constant returns to scale, with their sum close to one and therefore close to the results from the pooled specifications, suggesting our production function is appropriately specified. Our (so far) preferred estimate of Non-SPs' productivity effect (approximately 5) suggests that the productivity gains of hiring Non-SPs are substantial: Ceteris paribus, the average sample establishment (which has a Non-SP labor share of approximately 0.9%) is approximately 4.5% more productive than an otherwise equal establishment that hires no Non-SPs.
However, our result could be due to unobserved differences between SP and Non-SP inflows. So far, we have controlled only for observable characteristics by including inflows' share of high-qualified, age and age squared. Thus, we extend our specification to include inflows' mean sending-establishment wage position, separately for SPs and Non-SPs (columns three and four of Table 6 ). While the coefficients of both these variables are insignificant, Non-SPs' labor share coefficient drops sharply in magnitude and significance, using either the fixed effect or the median wage definition of (Non-)SPs. This finding suggests that the positive productivity outcome related to Non-SP hiring might be due to these workers' positive selection from their sending establishments, so there is no statistically significant productivity effect of hiring workers from inferior establishments per se.
Since our sample contains a disproportionate share of Eastern German establishments, we estimate the above specifications for the subsamples of Western and Eastern German establishments. The results for Western Germany, summarized in Table 7 , corroborate the previous findings: Non-SPs have a substantially positive and partly significant productivity coefficient (first two columns), unless we control for inflows' selection from sending establishments (third and fourth columns). In the latter case, not only does the coefficient of Non-SPs turn insignificant but we also find Non-SPs' positive selectivity to be significantly related to productivity (if (Non-)SPs are defined by establishment fixed effects). The latter finding substantiates our interpretation that hiring workers from inferior establishments increases productivity due to the positive selection of these workers. 9. Since the establishment controls are mostly time-invariant, we drop them without thereby affecting the results. 10. When the number of instruments is reduced, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively almost the same. The same is true when using the Arellano-Bond (Difference GMM) estimation procedure instead of the System GMM. The results are available upon request from the authors.
Concentrating the analysis on Western German establishments furthermore has the advantage that we can include the inflows' mean CHK person effect as a control variable. However, as columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 reveal, this mean of individual fixed effects is not significantly related to the hiring firms' productivity. We report estimates for Eastern German establishments in Appendix Table A3 . We do not find any significant productivity effects associated with worker inflows into these establishments. The estimates for Germany in total could thus be larger and more precisely estimated, were it not for the disproportionate sample share of Eastern German establishments. Thus, the positive productivity effect of Non-SPs found for Western German establishments appears to be due to these inflows' positive selection from their sending establishments. Considering our descriptive results (Non-SPs receive large wage gains from their job moves) and related studies (firms are increasingly important for determining wages; for example, Barth et al., 2016) , our findings may reflect job moves of workers with high productivity potential who did not see enough scope for career advancement at their previous employer.
A plausibility check of whether our results are indeed driven by assortative matching is shown in Table 8 . We investigate the relationship between inflows' sending-firm wage position and the size of their productivity effect. Hereto, SPs and Non-SPs are divided into two groups each, those with low-wage positions in their sending firms vs. those with high-wage positions in their sending firms. We use the median (0.9) of the sending-firm wage positions of all inflows (i.e., SPs plus Non-SPs) as threshold. If assortative matching is driving our results, inflows that were higher earners in their sending firm should have a stronger effect on productivity in their receiving firm. As Table 8 shows, the results tend to support our interpretation. The positive productivity effect of Non-SPs is driven by those with above-median wage positions in their sending firm. 11 Finally, to offer a more thorough economic explanation, we may return to the theoretical literature on job search and matching (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979) . The mobility process and the productivity and wage outcomes we observe are in line with these models, which suggest that direct (and thus voluntary) job-to-job moves serve to improve workers' job match quality. Thus, intuitively, highly productive workers (Non-SPs) matched with less productive firms improve their job match by leaving for a more productive firm, amounting to a positiveassortative matching mechanism.
This matching-based explanation can be tested empirically by further considering the proposition in the literature that mismatch correction should occur early rather than late in a bad job match (Jovanovic, 1979) , since long-tenured workers are relatively unlikely to be badly matched in their jobs, whereas shorttenured (and typically young) workers might still be in the stages of early-career 'job shopping.' 11 Thus, we test whether the positive productivity effect of Non-SPs is driven by workers with short tenure at their sending firm, splitting each of the two inflow groups further into two tenure groups, with 3 years as the cut-off between low and high tenure (thus, 60% of Non-SPs are classified as shorttenured). 12 The results from this exercise are summarized in Table 9 . Again, we find no corroborating evidence for the entire sample, but for the Western German subsample, the estimates suggest that it is indeed low-tenured Non-SPs who drive the overall Non-SP productivity effect.
As a final note on the interpretation of our estimates, let us emphasize that they are not necessarily causal relationships. Regarding the productivity effects 11. We thank one anonymous referee for noting this possibility. 12. We obtain very similar results when putting the tenure cut-off at only two years. Results are available upon request. of worker inflows, for an unambiguous causal interpretation, one would need a source of variation in inflows that is independent of hiring establishments' productivity. Possibly the best feasible approach has been taken by Serafinelli 
, who uses the number of downsizings (substantial reductions in staff) of high-wage firms in a region and industry as an instrumental variable for worker inflows into other (nonhigh wage) firms. We have constructed the same type of instrument, dividing all establishments within each region (alternatively, regional industry) into a high-wage and a low-wage group, separated at the median wage and a number of alternative thresholds, and defining downsizing establishments also by several alternative threshold values. Unfortunately, none of the proposed instruments is strong enough to explain the labor shares of SP and Non-SP inflows.
CONCLUSIONS
We investigate, for a sample of German manufacturing establishments, the productivity effects of hiring workers from superior and inferior establishments, as defined by establishments' relative wage levels. In all estimations, we control for hired workers' productivity-relevant characteristics, meaning that their productivity effects should stem only from their sending establishments' superiority or inferiority. While previous studies Zubanov, 2012, 2014; Serafinelli, 2013) find positive effects of hiring workers from superior establishments, our estimates suggest that hiring workers from inferior (lower paying) establishments increases hiring establishments' productivity. Obviously, having been employed at an inferior establishment per se is not a plausible explanation for this positive productivity effect. The effect could stem from a positive selection of worker inflows from inferior establishments, which in turn might reflect 'job shopping' and highly productive workers' on-the-job search for better job matchesi.e., matches with highly productive firms. Indeed, we find that inflows from inferior establishments are positively selected from their sending establishments, where they occupy relatively highwage positions. This selectivity explains their positive productivity effect, at least for Western German hiring establishments. In contrast, hiring workers from higher paying establishments does not seem to increase establishments' productivity, in line with the finding that they are not positively selected from their sending establishments. Thus, overall, our findings suggest that Western German establishments gain from hiring the best workers of less financially powerful establishments, but not from trying to tap the knowledge and experience of workers from higher paying (and potentially more productive) establishments.
To grasp the economic workings behind our findings, we also have to consider the individual worker's perspective: Despite being top earners at their initial employers, some workers at lower paying establishments earn far less than the average equally qualified worker at higher paying establishments. At the same time, they seem to have little scope for further wage improvement at their current employer. The only way to raise their wage substantially is by moving to a higher paying establishment. This may mean finding a better job match, as envisioned in the theoretical job search literature (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979) . In this sense, our findings reflect that some highly productive workers are initially badly matched with their employers but can correct this mismatch by moving to 'better' employers. Thus, good workers are reallocated toward good firms, which not only increases their wages but also the hiring firms' productivity.
One reason why our results differ from previous studies' might be the structural and institutional differences between national labor markets (for instance, Zubanov, 2012, 2014 use Danish data) . As Jolivet et al. (2006) and others show, Germany and Denmark differ much with regard to job-to-job mobility. In particular, in Denmark, mobility levels are higher and workers more often move involuntarily, due to differences in labor market institutions. Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) emphasize that labor markets with strict employment protection laws, such as Germany, are characterized by a positive selectivity of voluntary job movers, a relationship absent in leniently regulated Denmark. Thus, structural and institutional cross-country differences likely account for different causes and effects of interfirm worker flows.
Finally, our results reflect an increasing importance of firms for wage formation (cf. Barth et al., 2016) as well as the assortative pattern of worker mobility across firms found by Card et al. (2013) good workers sort into good firms. Our findings add that these workers are particularly 'good' compared to their colleagues in their firms of origin and that they have a positive effect on receiving firms' productivity, thus making these firms even 'better'.
A. EMPLOYMENT DATA
The IEB (Integrated Emplyoment Biographies) and BHP (Establishment History Panel) are 100% records of employment subject to social security contribution, while the IAB Establishment Panel, from which we draw establishment-level production data, is the largest establishment survey in Germany. To be precise we use IEB V10.00.00 (2012 ( ), BHP 7510 (1975 ( -2010 as well as Establishment Panel Waves 1999-2012. The IEB contain precise information about individuals' labor market biographies. They are based on different administrative sources and contain daily information on every individual in Germany either in employment subject to social security contribution, registered unemployed, or participating in measures of active labor market policy, excluding only civil servants and the selfemployed.
The assignment of workers to establishments, and crucial variables such as begin and end dates of employment spells, are highly reliable, as they are drawn from the official employment records of the Federal Employment Agency, and thus relevant for social security contributions. Importantly, workers are assigned not to firms but to establishments, that is, spatially fixed production units that may be part of multi-establishment firms. We argue that establishments are well suited for the analysis of worker inflows and productivity: In particular, assigning workers to establishments should provide a clearer link between individual workers' contributions and establishment-level productivity outcomes, compared to firm-level outcomes.
We count an individual worker as an inflow to establishment i if he or she was employed in another plant j before, both employment spells are at least 7 days long, and the worker move satisfies some further criteria as follows. Since we consider newly hired workers as knowledge carriers, we require them to satisfy several conditions. Most importantly, we disregard all inflows of unqualified workers, requiring inflows to hold at least a vocational degree. We exclude all inflows employed as apprentices, interns, or 'marginal' employees, either in the sending or hiring establishment. 13 Moreover, only incoming workers between the ages of 15 and 65, the official retirement age, are included. Furthermore, we choose to allow a maximum gap 13. Marginal employment is defined as employment not subject to social security contribution, with the monthly wage not exceeding (currently) 450 Euros, see Section 8, Subsec. 1, No. 1, of the German Social Code IV (SGB IV).
of half a year (182 days) between consecutive employment spells. Therein, periods of registered unemployment must not be longer than 3 months. By German standards, this transition period should be generous enough to retain most of the relevant worker transitions, but rule out overly long employment gaps during which workers' recently acquired knowledge may already begin to depreciate.
The key criterion for the identification of inflows from other establishments is a change in the establishment identification number (establishment ID) in a worker's employment biography. In this context, three issues, which typically plague analyses of interestablishment worker flows, have to be discussed: parallel employment spells, change in establishment ID and flows between establishments that belong to the same firm. First, a worker could be employed by two employers at the same time. For each point in time (i.e., each day), we assign each worker to a single employer, using the highest daily wage as the criterion of assignment. Second, as Hethey and Schmieder (2010) note with regard to the IAB data, establishment IDs appear and disappear not only in cases of plant creation and closure but also in cases of spin-offs, acquisitions, restructurings and changes in owner. To not include worker flows that stem from such events rather than 'real' mobility decisions, we disregard such clustered flows, as identified by Hethey and Schmieder (2010) . Third, we must check further whether any two establishments between which we observe worker flows are part of the same firm. We make use of a Stata routine developed by Sch€ affler (2014) to estimate which establishments probably belong to the same firm and disregard worker flows between such establishments. Thus, we ensure that the worker flows entering our analysis are not spurious in the sense that they do not represent worker mobility between two economically independent establishments.
At the level of (hiring) establishments, to which our main estimations refer, our data exclude some rare obvious outliers in terms of our central model variables, notably regarding the number of inflows. We drop these observations from our sample. Establishments with less than five full-time equivalent employees are also excluded. Unfortunately, there are a substantial number of missing values particularly in the establishment survey data, so we lose a substantial number of observations due to survey nonresponse. To obtain the capital stock, we use the modified perpetual inventory method (PIM) by M€ uller (2008), deducing capital from net investment, which is surveyed in the IAB Establishment Panel. As emphasized by Ehrl (2013, p. 760) , whose procedure we also employ, the PIM must be further corrected for restructuring events such as insourcing, closure, sell-off and spin-off of parts of the establishment.
APPENDIX B. ESTABLISHMENT FIXED WAGE EFFECTS
We run OLS regressions, separately for each of the relevant years, of all regular full-time employees in any of the sending or hiring establishments at the reference date June 30. By performing the regression separately for each year, we identify the establishment fixed effect not from variation across time, but across workers. More explicitly, we estimate for each year:
where lnw pi is the log wage of worker p working at establishment i, occ stat lp;i is a categorical variable indicating the occupational status of worker p in that particular job at establishment i (e.g., blue-collar vs. white-collar, which can be related to different wage groups defined in collective agreements), qual mp is a categorical variable of worker p's qualification level, and d occ2 n;p;i is a two-digit occupation dummy. Since wages are censored at the social security contribution limit (this concerns some 15% of employees), we impute them using a modified version of Gartner's (2005) procedure. Additional to the covariates in the wage regression (B1), for the imputation we use region and industry fixed effects, the mean noncensored log wage in the establishment and year, and the share of censored worker observations in the establishment and year. We run the imputation separately for four cells, dividing the population between women and men, and between Eastern and Western Germany. The results suggest that some 70% of unexplained wage variance is due to establishment fixed effects (h i ), indicating the importance of establishments for the determination of wages (see the estimation results for the first year (2000) in Table A4 ). To be used as a criterion for ranking pairs of sending and hiring establishments, the estimates of h i are regressed on a set of industry dummies at the three-digit level, analogous to Zubanov (2012, 2014) and Serafinelli (2013) , yielding a corrected establishment fixed effect. This correction accounts for systematic productivity differences, for example due to industry-specific technologies, that we do not want to determine the ranking between pairs of establishments. Table A1 presents the correlations between each pair of variables. Although far from a perfect fit, the establishment fixed effect is fairly correlated with labor productivity (log value-added per worker). The correlation with TFP, obtained as the residual from a simple OLS regression of value-added on capital and labor (all in logs), is rather low at 0.277. This may be due to the measurement of capital, which we obtain using investment data and the perpetual inventory method, implying that TFP is measured with some error. The correlation of our wage-rank criteria with log value-added per worker is much higher (0.528 and 0.553, respectively). Comparing both criteria, the establishment median wage reflects productivity better than the establishment fixed effect, albeit by a small margin. We thus use both measures to rank sending and hiring establishments, to assess the robustness of our results.
One might also consider using an establishment fixed wage effect, computed from worker flows across firms as suggested by Abowd et al. (1999; henceforth AKM) to rank sending and hiring establishments. AKM isolate establishment fixed wage effects from worker fixed effects as well as from the idiosyncratic effects of worker-establishment matches. Thus, the establishment fixed effect measures the wage premium (or penalty) paid by an establishment to all its workers, regardless of the workers' individual characteristics and match-specific effects. Serafinelli (2013) uses such an effect to divide sending firms into high-wage and nonhighwage firms. An equivalent effect (the 'CHK establishment effect') has already been computed for German establishments by Card et al. (2015) , and it is available for a large fraction of our sample. However, we still prefer the establishment fixed effect and the log median wage, as the CHK establishment effect is time-invariant across our observation period (it is constructed for several 8-year intervals). This is reflected in a substantially lower correlation with direct productivity measures (0.13 for TFP and 0.33 for log value-added per worker). explicitly, the main problem arises from the possibility of the firm to observe its idiosyncratic TFP shock before choosing its levels of capital and labor; the idiosyncratic effect thus is an omitted variable that needs to be controlled for. Otherwise, it is being transmitted to the observed inputs (capital and labor), i.e., the production factors' coefficients take up the idiosyncratic effect and are thus biased upward. In contrast, a downward bias can result from imprecise measurement of inputs (attenuation bias). The idiosyncratic TFP shock represents, above all, simultaneity or reverse causality, i.e., the simultaneous or reversed determination of factor inputs with respect to the realized output. EH discuss three approaches to combat these endogeneity biases. The first approach, instrumenting factor inputs using factor prices, can be ignored in the case of our study. Instead, we focus on the problem of endogeneity (reverse causality) bias arising from establishments' anticipation of their productivity level and their according choice of inputs. The two main approaches to minimize this bias are, first, control function approaches trying to model the idiosyncratic TFP shock explicitly, and second, dynamic panel data (DPD) approaches making use of internal instruments in panel datasets. The first class of estimators has been developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP), Ackerberg et al. (2015) (ACF) and Wooldridge (2009) (WOP); the second class is rooted in the work of Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (BB) .
To construct the control function for the idiosyncratic TFP shock observed by the firm but not the researcher, OP, LP, ACF and WOP need to assume that this shock is the only unobservable entering the investment (respectively, intermediate inputs) function. This 'scalar unobservable assumption' (EH) cannot be tested. More specifically, to identify the labor coefficient, which should be more important, given our core explanatory variables, than identifying the capital coefficient, the structural estimators assume a discrete sequence of establishments' decisions about the particular factor inputs. Again, this assumption cannot be tested empirically (EH, p. 24).
Using the longitudinal dimension of panel data, the DPD estimators control for time-invariant unobserved establishment heterogeneity. This eliminates omitted variable bias. However, the bias due to unobserved productivity shocks would be removed only if these were time-constant. The DPD estimators indicated above, by using internal IVs, take an additional step to combat this endogeneity bias. Furthermore, unlike the 'structural' estimators (OP, LP, etc.), the DPD estimators allow one to test all crucial assumptions made about the data-generating process (DGP). It could thus be argued that, overall, the DPD estimators are a more conservative choice than any of the 'structural' (control function) estimators. However, due to using only within-establishment variation in a fat panel, one may fail to identify effects with any precision using these estimators. Aiming to maximize the robustness of our findings, we employ both classes of estimators.
